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I.

INTRODUCTION1
As set forth by Appellants (the "Bondholders") in their opening brief, this

appeal raises the issue of whether personal jurisdiction is proper over corporate
officers and directors who are alleged to have committed acts (or actionable
inaction) in violation of Utah's securities laws within Utah or which affected
persons or businesses within Utah. Appellants established before the trial court
that Appellees were "Executive Officers and Directors" of LES at the time of the
issuance. (RA0682). Appellants specifically alleged that Appellees controlled
LES, and thereby committed a tort within or at a minimum having effects in this
state, at the time of the offering of the securities that were issued and sold by
means of material misstatements. (RA 09-07). Even absent such allegations, Utah
law explicitly presumes the same. Utah Code Ann. § 61-1-22(4).
The affidavits submitted by Appellees to the trial court did not contest the
key facts set forth in the Complaint and submitted to the trial court in opposition to
Appellees' motions to dismiss. In opposing Appellees' motions to dismiss in the
trial court, the Bondholders submitted evidence of the following facts which
remain uncontested, despite Appellees' inappropriate attempts to introduce
unsupported fact argument now: (1) LES caused securities to be issued in Utah;
1

This Reply brief simultaneously replies to the four separate briefs filed by
Appellees as follows: Brief of Appellees David E. Thomas, Jr., John W. Rollins,
-•• Jr., John W. Rollins, Sr., James L. Wareham, Grover C. Wrenn, and Henry B.
Tippie ("Thomas et al. Br.") (June 24, 2003); Brief of Appellee Henry H. Taylor
('Taylor Br.") (June 27, 2003); Brief of Appellee Michael J. Bragagnolo
("Bragagnolo Br.") (June 23, 2003); and Brief of Appellees James R. Bullock,
John R. Grainger and Leslie W. Haworth ("Bullock et al. Br.") (June 24, 2003).
-1-
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(2) those securities were offered and sold to the Bondholders by means of false or
misleading statements; and (3) Appellees were directors and officers of LES at the
time of the Issuance. See BOA 182. Neither Appellees nor the trial court below
addressed the relevant evidence and law. Appellees have continued this tack,
reiterating the same arguments made before the trial court, namely that:
(a) liability does not equal jurisdiction; and (b) mere corporate title does not confer
jurisdiction over a corporate officer. These general principles are simply
unresponsive to Appellants' argument and to the circumstances of this case.
IL

ARGUMENT
A.

Appellees Misstate the Applicable Facts on Appeal,

Appellees continue to rely on wholly inapplicable facts to contest Utah's
personal jurisdiction over them. Further, they attempt to introduce new factual
argument inappropriately on appeal, in an apparent attempt to discredit the
Bondholders' "prima facie" case for liability. This approach is impermissible
under Utah law. Newavs, Inc. v. McCausland, 950 P.2d 420, 422 (Utah 1997);
Anderson v. American Society of Plastic Surgeons, 807 P.2d 825 (Utah 1990).3

2

"BOA" refers to Brief of Appellants, filed April 25, 2003.

3

Appellee Taylor's additional contention that Appellants "fail[ed] to
marshal unrebutted evidence," thereby "doom[ing]" the appeal, is simply
confused. Taylor Br. at 10-11. The Utah Supreme Court considers parties'
affidavits to be "documentary evidence," and reviews any legal decision taken
thereon for "correctness" only. Phone Directories Co., Inc. v. Henderson, 8 P. 3d
256, 258 (Utah 2000). The case on which Taylor relies for his argument imposes
a "clearly erroneous" standard of review, which is clearly inapposite here. West
Valley City v. Majestic Inv. Co., 818 P. 2d 1311 (Utah Ct. App. 1991). Moreover,
as Appellants set forth previously, "because the propriety of a motion to dismiss is
-2-
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First, Appellees now claim that there is no evidence that Appellants
purchased the Bonds in the initial offering, or that Appellants even received the
Preliminary Offering Memorandum. See Thomas et al. Br. at 8. However, the
Bondholders alleged in their Complaint that they purchased the Bonds in an
"offering that was covered by the Offering Memorandum" and that they relied to
their detriment on the Offering Memorandum when purchasing the Bonds. (RA
09, 03). These allegations, in that they "pertain[ed] to the Plaintiffs' personal
circumstances," were made based on their personal knowledge - not on
"information and belief." (RA 022). These matters were not contested by
Appellees in their affidavits submitted to the trial court. (See Defendants'
Affidavits at RA 027-024, 032-028, 037-033, 0164-0162, 0167-0165, 0170-0168,
0173-0171,0176-0174,0179-0177).
Appellees also now belatedly contend that there is no evidence that LES
caused the Issuance. Thomas et al. Br. at 8. However, the evidence shows that the
Bonds, entitled "Pollution Control Refunding Revenue Bonds (Laidlaw
Environmental Services, Inc.) 1997 A", were secured by a $45.7 million loan
agreement entered into by LES in the state of Utah. (RA 0643-0612). The
a question of law," the Utah Supreme Court "giv[es] no deference to the decision
of the trial court." Wagner v. Clifton, 62 P. 3d 440, 441 (Utah 2002). Finally,
Appellants cited directly to Defendants' Affidavits in their opening brief, and
demonstrated how those affidavits in fact failed to rebut the facts giving rise to
personal jurisdiction over Defendants-Appellees. BOA 11, 27. At this stage, the
Court "accept[s] the factual allegations" set forth by plaintiffs "as true and
considers] them, and all reasonable inferences to be drawn from them, in the light
most favorable to the non-moving party." Id.
-3-
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Offering Memorandum identified LES as the "Obligated Person" under the Bonds
(RA 0716), and that LES itself "requested that the County issue" the Bonds in
order to refund and retire an earlier bond issuance and to continue financing "the
costs of acquisition and construction by the Borrower [LES]" of a "Project." (RA
0639). This Project consisted of constructing and operating "certain hazardous
waste disposal facilities in the County" which were "owned by the Borrower
[LES]." Id.
This evidence was presented in the lower court proceedings by Appellants.
Appellees did not contest it at that time. (RA 027-024, 032-028, 037-033, 01640162, 0167-0165, 0170-0168, 0173-0171, 0176-0174, 0179-0177).
Appellees also now attempt to dispute whether the Bonds were even issued
in Utah. See Thomas et al. Br. at 8. Others, however, concede this fact. See, e.g.,
Taylor Br. at 2. The uncontested evidence in the lower court showed that the
issuer was located in Utah, and that the Bonds were to be delivered to New York
from Utah. (RA 0646-0645, 0650-51). Further, Utah law explicitly regulates the
sale or offer of securities originating in this state. See Utah Code Ann. § 61-1-26.
Appellees have not contested that, at a minimum, the offering originated in Utah.
(RA 0646).
The pertinent uncontested facts underlying this appeal remain undisturbed
on this appeal, and are that (1) LES caused securities to be issued in Utah;
(2) those securities were offered and sold to Appellants by means of false or
misleading statements; and (3) Appellees were directors or officers of LES at the
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
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time of the issuance. (BOA at 18; RA 026-01, 0747-0742, 0682). Appellees did
not contest any of these facts in the proceedings below. (RA 027-024, 032-028,
037-033, 0164-0162, 0167-0165, 0170-0168, 0173-0171, 0176-0174, 0179-0177).
They may not do so now.
B.

The Bondholders' Allegations and Proof Were Sufficient to Meet
Their Burden at the Personal Jurisdiction Stage,

Appellees contend that the Bondholders failed to set forth "sufficient facts"
by which a Utah court may properly exercise personal jurisdiction over them. See
generally Bullock et aL Br., Bragagnolo Br., Taylor Br., Thomas et al. Br.
Appellees either ignore or belatedly contest evidence of the very facts on which
Appellants rely.4 Moreover, Appellees mischaracterize relevant analogous
caselaw holding a corporation's officers and directors personally accountable for
the acts of the corporation over whom they exercise control, which may
specifically be used for the purpose of exercising personal jurisdiction over them.
Seagate Technology v. A.J. Kogyo, Co., 219 Cal. App. 3d 696 (1990). Finally,
Appellants' burden at this stage of the proceedings does not require that they
prove the merits of their Complaint; such determination is only appropriate at trial.
1.

Appellants' Burden

On a defendant's motion to dismiss for lack of personal jurisdiction, a
plaintiff bears the burden of "mak[ing] a prima facie showing of personal
jurisdiction." Neways, 950 P. 2d at 422. Plaintiffs are only required to prove

4

See discussion supra at sections I and II.A.
-5-
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jurisdiction by "a preponderance of the evidence" at trial or in an evidentiary
hearing. Anderson, 807 P. 2d at 827. Courts addressing a motion to dismiss for
lack of personal jurisdiction must take care to avoid resolving the merits of the
controversy, and the plaintiff's factual allegations must be accepted as true "unless
specifically controverted by the defendant's affidavits or by depositions."
Neways, 950 P.2d at 422.
Appellants' allegations and the undisputed facts in the record are sufficient
to confer personal jurisdiction over Appellees at this stage of the proceedings.
Appellants' complaint alleges that Appellees controlled LES at the time of the
unlawful sale of securities in Utah. (RA 09). Appellants produced further
evidence before the trial court showing that Appellees transacted business in Utah
either themselves or through an agent by way of, inter alia, the $45.7 million loan
signed for by the then Chief Financial Officer of LES, Paul Humphreys,
underlying the Issuance. (RA 0643-0612). Appellees as a whole have done
nothing more than to testify to their lack of domicile in Utah, and several to their
lack of physical "participation" in the issuance. (RA 027-024, 032-028, 037-033,
0164-0162, 0167-0165, 0170-0168, 0173-0171, 0176-0174, 0179-0177). For the
purpose of determining jurisdiction, Appellees have not contested that they
transacted business in Utah sufficient to confer personal jurisdiction over them
through (a) their presumptive control of LES during the Issuance; (b) contracting
to insure the Issuance through the loan to LES in this state; and (c) LES'
"ownership" of the project in Utah that was funded by the Issuance. See Utah
- 6-
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Code Ann. § 78-27-24.
Appellees' attacks on San Mateo County Transit District v. Dearman,
Fitzgerald & Roberts, Inc., 979 F.2d 1356 (9th Cir. 1992) are unpersuasive.5
Appellants do not rely on San Mateo solely for the proposition that the trial court
would have jurisdiction over a defendant "wherever he may be found" so long as
the suit was brought to enforce a liability created by Utah securities law. Rather,
San Mateo provides, under analogous federal law, that the pleading standard for
asserting personal jurisdiction is substantially lower than that for liability. San
Mateo, 979 F. 2d at 1358 ("[t]he standard for liability" under the federal securities
laws "is lower than the district court thought. Even lower is the standard for
personal jurisdiction, which exists if the plaintiff makes a non-frivolous allegation
that the defendant controlled a person liable for the fraud"). Here, the
Bondholders have easily met their burden under section 61-1-22(4). San Mateo's
reference to the pleading burden at the two separate stages of determining liability
and jurisdiction further illustrates the difference between determining the merits of
a case and the defendants' jurisdictional contacts. See also discussion infra at

5

In re Baan Company Securities Litigation, 81 F. Supp. 2d 75 (D.D.C.
2000), which Appellees cite in disagreement with San Mateo, is inapposite to the
present analysis. In re Baan merely stands for the proposition that the Due Process
-- clause is to be adhered to in all instances. Id. at 80. Appellants do not argue
otherwise. See discussion infra at section II.B.2, 3. Moreover, with respect to the
pleading requirements for setting forth either liability or for personal jurisdiction,
San Mateo is a 9th Circuit opinion that remains good law and is unchallenged both
in the 9th and 10th Circuits.

271959.1
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II.B.4.6
2.

It is Appellees' Personal and Unrefuted Acts, Not Their
Mere Liability Under Section 61-1-22(4), Which Satisfy
Utah's Long-Arm Statute and Due Process.

Appellees assert, as they did in the trial court below, that the Bondholders
ask this Court simply to equate the Appellees' liability with the right to exercise
personal jurisdiction over them. See, e.g., Taylor Br. at 12 ("liability and
jurisdiction are independent"). This oversimplifies, and thereby misconstrues,
both the relevant facts and Appellants' argument. Appellees' liability under
section 61-1-22(4) is merely one element of the jurisdictional analysis.
"Specific" personal jurisdiction arises over a non-resident defendant when
he has purposefully availed himself of forum benefits, and where the controversy
arises out of a defendant's contacts with the forum. See Neways, 950 P. 2d at 423
(citing Burger King Corp. v. Rudzewicz, 471 U.S. 462, 472-73 (1985)).
Appellees' uncontroverted contacts with Utah satisfy this standard.
First, Appellants set forth specific allegations of Appellees' activities as
6

Several Appellees refer to a recent decision by the California Court of
Appeal disagreeing with this reading of San Mateo, and affirming the dismissal of
claims against these same defendants for lack of personal jurisdiction. See
Thomas et al. Br. at 9; Bragagnolo Br. at 16. As pointed out by other of the
Appellees, however, that decision was unpublished, and Cal. Rule of Court 977(a)
flatly prohibits citation or reliance on it. See Bullock et al. Br. at 4, fn. 4; Taylor
Br. at 16, fn. 4. The relevant rule is printed at the top of the opinion. Bragagnolo
and Thomas et al. have nonetheless gone so far as to either directly quote from the
opinion or attach it as an exhibit. For the reasons more fully detailed in
Appellants' separately filed motion to strike, this Court should strike from the
record Appellees' submissions to the extent they cite to or rely on Eaton Vance
Distributors v. Grainger, No. C040158, 2003 WL 1521896 (Cal. Ct. App. Mar. 25,
2003).

271959.1
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control persons. (RA 09-08). Second, as officers and directors of a corporation at
the time the corporation acted in violation of Utah securities laws, Appellees are
personally liable, without the necessity of proof by Appellants, for the commission
of a tort within or having effects in Utah. Utah Code Ann. § 61-1-22(4). Third, as
analogous caselaw has held, for persons who are "personally responsible for
causing the corporation to act," that "act may be imputed to the officer[s] for
purposes of establishing personal jurisdiction over [them]." Seagate Technology,
219 Cal. App. 3d at 703 (emphasis added). Appellees' personal and imputed acts
(and not merely the Appellees' "corporate title") (a) took place in the state; (b) had
effects in the state; and (c) bear a substantial connection to the liability asserted
here. Together, these facts constitute the "minimum contacts" necessary under
Utah law to support personal jurisdiction. Neways, 950 P.2d at 423. .
Appellate courts in other states have held that even the acts of a liable
corporation - and not just the acts of the officers and directors as controlling
persons - may be imputed to the individual officers and directors for the purpose
of establishing personal jurisdiction over them. In Lundgren v. Superior Court,
the California Court of Appeal issued a writ of mandate quashing the service of
summons over an out of state shareholder of a corporation that was itself subject to
personal jurisdiction in California. In doing so, however, the court specifically
looked first to whether the acts or liability of any other in-state actor could be
imputed to him. The court held that even though the out-of-state shareholder's
"denial of participation [stood] uncontradicted in this record," before determining
-9-
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whether personal jurisdiction over him was proper,
[w]e must look to the corporation law of Oregon to determine the
relationship which Oregon law creates between a professional
corporation chartered under that law and its shareholders.
Specifically we must ascertain whether the acts of one shareholderofficer of an Oregon professional corporation are deemed to be the
acts of another shareholder-officer.
Lundgren v. Superior Court, 111 Cal. App. 3d477, 486 (1980) (emphasis added).
The Court examined Oregon's Professional Corporation Act, and found that even
though the statute did hold any shareholder "jointly and severally liable" with any
other shareholder for their tortious conduct, the plaintiff in the case before the
Court did not fall within the definition of those eligible to recover.7 The Court
thus held:

-

Since R. A. Lundgren did not personally participate in the
transaction which is the subject of the cross-complaint, and since the
Oregon Corporation Law does not impute to him any legal
responsibility to Tplaintiffsl other than fthose identified in the
statute!, it follows that R. A. Lundgren cannot be said to have had
any "activity" in California and there is no basis for subjecting him
to California jurisdiction in the pending action.

Lundgren, 111 Cal. App. 3d at 487.

7

The relevant language from the Oregon statute was as follows: "A
shareholder of a professional corporation may be held.. Jointly and severally
liable with all of the other shareholders of the corporation for the negligent or
wrongful acts or misconduct committed by any shareholder, or by a person under
the direct supervision and control of any shareholder in the rendering of
professional services on behalf of the corporation to a person receiving the
service." 111 Cal. App. 3d at 486, n.2 (citing Ore. Rev. Stats. Ch. 58.185). The
Court held that since plaintiff was not "a person receiving the service," the statute
did not operate, and the acts of the liable shareholder could not be imputed to the
defendant. Id. at 486.
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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The analysis and holding are directly applicable here. Section 61-122(4) provides "every principal executive officer or director of a corporation... [is]
liable" under Utah's Corporations Code, "unless" they prove that they "had no
knowledge of or reasonable grounds to believe in the existence of facts by reason
of which the liability" was alleged to exist. Utah Code Ann. § 61-1-22(4).
Appellees did not meet this burden of proof (and in any event could not at the
motions stage). See Lundgren, supra. Accordingly, the "activity" of the
corporation should be imputed to them for the purpose of determining personal
jurisdiction. Id; Seagate Technology, supra; Utah Code Ann. § 61-l-22(4).8
Appellees cite a litany of cases for the general proposition that liability
and/or corporate title does not "automatically give rise to jurisdiction." See, e.g.,
Bullock et al. Br. at 23-28; Bragagnolo Br. at 13-15; Taylor Br. at 12-16; Rollins
Br. at 20-23. However, as Appellants previously demonstrated in their opening

8

In addition to the factors set forth in Appellants' opening brief
distinguishing Schlatter v. Mo-Comm Futures, Ltd., 662 P. 2d 553 (Kan. 1983)
from the present case, that case also included no discussion of whether any act
could be imputed to the officers and directors of a corporation in order to establish
personal jurisdiction over them, as is explicitly considered by the foregoing cases.
Seagate Technology, supra; Lundgren, supra. Additionally, Kansas' statute is not
identical to the Utah statute, as Bragagnolo contends (and other Appellees
recognize). Bragagnolo Br. at 16-17, fn. 7; Taylor Br. at 15 (observing that the
Kansas statute is "nearly identical" to Utah's) (emphasis added). Kansas' statute
is different in at least one crucial respect, in that the phrase "who materially aids in
the sale" modifies the entire list of corporate officers, directors and employees
who may be held liable under the statute, rather than just "employee[s]" as set
forth in the Utah statute. Compare Kansas Stat. Ann. § 17-1268(b) with Utah
Code Ann. §61-1-22(4).

-11-
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brief, these cases are inapposite. See BOA 28-30. None of them implicates or
arises under section 61-1-22(4) or analogous law.
For example, Asahi Metal Indus. Co., Ltd. v. Superior Court 480 U.S. 102,
112 (1987) holds generally that "[a] finding of minimum contacts must come
about by an action of the defendant purposefully directed toward the forum state,"
but contrary to Appellees' contention, does not stand for the unsupported assertion
that "'presumed' acts could [not] serve as the basis for specific jurisdiction."
Taylor Br. at 30. Indeed, the court in Asahi, as with all of the other cases
Appellees cite, was not faced with a factual or legal scenario like that presented
here, where officers and directors are explicitly presumed liable under a state
statute for causing a corporation to act, and where states interpreting analogous
laws have permitted such acts to be imputed to them for the purpose of
establishing personal jurisdiction over them. See SII Megadiamond, Inc. v.
American Superabrasives, Corp., 969 P. 2d 430, 436 (Utah 1998) (breach of
contract action); Rhoades v. Wright, 622 P. 2d 343 (Utah 1980) (wrongful death
action); Mallory Engineering, Inc. v. Ted R. Brown & Assoc, Inc., 618 P. 2d 1004
(Utah 1980) (breach of contract action); Harnischfeger Engineers, Inc. v. Uniflo
Conveyor, Inc., 883 F. Supp. 608, 610 (D. Utah 1995) (breach of contract action);
see also Central States, Southeast and Southwest Areas Pension Fund v. Reimer
Express World Corp., 230 F. 3d 934 (7th Or. 2000) (interpreting non-analogous
Multiemployer Pension Plan Amendments Act, and holding that facts were
insufficient for court to pierce the corporate veil and assume personal jurisdiction
-12-
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over corporate parent); American Tel. & Tel. Co. v. Compagnie Bruxelles
Lambert, 94 F.3d 586 (9th Cir. 1996) (no presumptive liabiUty question presented,
and therefore no "imputed" acts possible); Sher v. Johnson, 911 F. 2d 1357 (9th
Cir. 1990) (same); In re Daimler-Chrysler AG Sec. Litig., 197 F. Supp. 2d 86, 99
(D. Del. 2002) (holding that plaintiff's allegations at least "raisefd] a colorable
showing of personal jurisdiction" over defendant for acts violative of federal
securities laws, and permitting plaintiffs to conduct jurisdictional discovery).
3.

Personal Jurisdiction Based on the Acts of Appellees,
Imputed or Otherwise, Satisfies Due Process.

The undisputed facts and allegations recited above, together with section
61-1-22(4), establish for pleading purposes the knowing or negligent conduct of
Appellees having effects in Utah in violation of Utah's securities laws. As such,
they constitute constitutionally cognizable "minimum contacts" justifying the
exercise of personal jurisdiction over Appellees. Neways, 950 P. 2d at 423.9
Appellees bear the burden of demonstrating that personal jurisdiction
would be "unreasonable" - i.e., whether it comports with "traditional notions of
fair play and substantial justice." International Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 U.S.

9

Appellees' argument that "purely financial injury to Utah residents"
cannot confer jurisdiction is misleading. The District Court decision which was
affirmed by Far West Capital Inc. v. Towne. 46 F. 3d 1071 (10th Cir. 1995)
actually held that, additionally, "[o]ne factor which is indicative of whether the
— nonresident has purposefully availed himself of the privileges and protections of
the laws of the forum state requires inquiry into which party initiated the
formation of the relationship" between the forum and the nonresident. Far West
Capital Inc. v. Towne, 828 F. Supp. 909, 914 (D. Utah 1993). As set forth herein,
LES initiated the Issuance.
-13-
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310 (1945). Appellees have not attempted to argue that it would be unfair or
unjust to call LES, as the controlled entity, to account in Utah for its violations of
Utah securities law. For the same reasons, Appellees cannot do so with respect to
themselves. See, e^g., Lundgren, supra. At a minimum, Appellees have failed to
disprove that they knew or had reason to know of the existence of facts by reason
of which LES potential liability under Utah Code Ann. § 61-1-1 et seq., could
have been established. Hence, for pleading purposes, Appellees may be deemed
to have knowingly committed a tort under Utah's securities laws either within or
having effects in this state. Utah Code Ann. § 61-1-22(4); Seagate Technology,
supra; Lundgren, supra.
LES initiated the sale of securities in Utah with the aid of material financial
misstatements. (RA 0746, 022, 012-011). LES did so pursuant to a loan
obligating them in the amount of $45.7 million. (RA 0746, 0643-0612). These
facts, in tandem with Utah's service statutes, manifestly implicate Utah's interest
in enforcing its securities laws. Taken together, they demonstrate the
"foreseeability" and hence the "reasonableness" of subjecting Appellees to
personal jurisdiction here. International Shoe, supra; Utah Code Ann. §61-122(4). The self-identified "Canadian" directors can argue no differently. Bullock
et al. Br. at 34. "When minimum contacts have been established, often the
interests of the plaintiff and the forum in the exercise of jurisdiction will justify
even the serious burdens placed on [an] alien defendant." Asahi, 480 U.S. at
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114.10
Furthermore, the requirement of "individualized" determination with
respect to personal jurisdiction over each of the Appellees is met by both their
uniform status under the law, and their uniform failure to contest the relevant facts
and allegations demonstrating their commission of a tort within or transaction of
business in Utah. Keeton v. Hustler Magazine, Inc., 465 U.S. 770 (1984).
Appellees do not "fall into three groups" as Appellees contend. Thomas et al. Br.
at 3. They fall into one - directors and officers of a liable entity - under the
explicit terms of the statute. Utah Code Ann. § 61-1-22(4).
Appellees' reliance on D.A. v. State (In the Interest of W.A.), 63 P. 3d 607
(Utah 2002) for the proposition that a Utah statute may not confer jurisdiction
without constraint by the due process clause of the United States Constitution
misses the mark. Appellants have not argued that the due process clause need not
be satisfied in this instance. Rather, Appellants have argued that Appellees have
sufficient minimum contacts with the state, as illustrated through, inter alia, their
control of LES both in the Issuance itself and the Loan underyling it, so as to
10

In Asahi, the court declined to exercise personal jurisdiction over a
Japanese corporation, when California's interest in adjudicating the matter was
"slight." The facts are easily distinguishable from the present situation, however,
as there were no American parties (the dispute was between a Japanese
corporation and a Taiwanese corporation), and the dispute did not impact "safety
standards" (which California presumably bore a strong interest in regulating), but
rather merely indemnification. Asahi, 480 U.S. at 114-115. The present case
involves the violation of Utah's securities laws, which the state has an express
interest in regulating and are thereby more analogous to "safety standards" than to
"indemnification."
-15-
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satisfy due process concerns in connection with the exercise of personal
jurisdiction over them. The Supreme Court inD.A. "did not reach the issue of
whether [defendant] had sufficient contacts with Utah" so as to satisfy due process
concerns, as it relied on the "status exception" to the due process clause. As far as
the "sufficient contacts" test is concerned, therefore, D.A. is inapposite.
a.

Defendants Incorrectly Contend That Appellants
Set Forth Utah Code Ann, § 61-1-26 as an
Independent Basis for Jurisdiction.

Contrary to Appellees' contention, Appellants did not address section 61-126 in their opening brief as an "independent basis for the exercise of personal
jurisdiction." Thomas et al. Br. at 32. Instead, the Bondholders cite section 61-126, and analogous provisions in various states, in support of their argument that
Appellees were on notice that they might be haled into court in Utah for their
violations of this state's securities laws. BOA at 36-44. Appellants raised the
very existence of section 61-1-26, in other words, to illustrate the "foreseeability"
of Appellees being haled into court here, in accordance with the due process
clause, particularly where Utah law additionally assigns in-state acts or acts by an
agent of a non-resident person having effects in Utah to violators of Utah's
corporations code. Utah Code Ann. §§61-1-26, 78-27-23 (providing that
"'transaction of business within this state' mean[s] activities of a nonresident
person, his agents, or representatives in this state" with effects in Utah) (emphasis
added); Harnischfeger, supra (superseded by statute on other grounds).
Appellants also raise section 61-1-26 as indicative of this state's interest in
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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adjudicating violations of its securities laws. BOA at 36-37. Finally, Appellants
set forth applicable caselaw interpreting provisions identical to section 61-1-26 to
confer personal jurisdiction over out-of-state defendants under facts which are
analogous to those present here.11 American Microtel Inc. v. Massachusetts, 1995
WL 809575. * 10-11 (Mass. Super. Jan. 27, 1995); Brown v. Investment
Management and Research, Inc., 323 S.C. 395 (1996). Appellees' attempts to
distinguish these cases are unavailing. Appellees' citation of Harbourvest
International Private Equity Partners II-Direct Fund, L.P. v. Axent Technologies,
Inc., 2000 WL 1466096 (Mass. Super. Aug. 21, 2000) for the simple proposition
that the "court's exercise of personal jurisdiction must 'also comport with the
requirements of Due Process'" misses the point. Thomas et al. Br. at 33.
Appellants do not contend that section 61-1-26, and similar statutes, eliminate due
process consideration. For starters, section 61-1-26 by its very language deems
"conduct prohibited" under Utah's securities laws to be equivalent to consent to
jurisdiction in the state. Utah Code Ann. § 61-1-26(8). It is this very "conduct" whether imputed to Appellees or otherwise - that is at the heart of both the
minimum contacts and due process analysis. Furthermore, it is the very existence
of section 61-1-26 and its explicit language, when taken together with facts such

11

In American Microtel and in Brown, there was prima facie evidence of
acts constituting an underlying securities violation in the state. Here, there is
similar uncontested evidence with respect to LES, which for the reasons set forth
above, permits the Court to impute those acts to Appellees sufficient to trigger this
state's long-arm statute.
-17-
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as those present here, including: (a) violations of a state's securities laws by a
corporate entity; (b) presumed control of that entity by its officers and directors;
(c) the imputed actions of those officers and directors taking place in or directed at
the state, with effects in the state; and (d) transaction of business in this state either
directly or by an agent, which demonstrate both the foreseeability of haling such
officers and directors into court in the state in question, as well as the state's
avowed interest in doing so.
4.

Appellees' Attempts to Discount Appellants' Argument
Under Seagate Technology and Analogous State Law are
Unpersuasive.

Appellees rely upon Taylor-Rush v. Multitech Corp., 217 Cal. App. 3d 103
(1990), which they claim interprets Cal. Corp. Code § 25504, an analogous statute
to section 61-1-22(4), in an attempt to discredit the Bondholders' reading of the
Utah statute. Bullock et al. Br. at 24-25; Thomas et al. Br. at 30-31. However,
Taylor-Rush is plainly distinguishable from the present case. The Court in TaylorRush considered allegations of breach of contract and fraud, including a "bland
allegation of conspiracy" as to a company's officers and directors, without even
discussing - much less finding - whether any corporation was or could be found
liable under California's securities laws. As there was no liable corporation under
Cal. Corp. Code § 25501, no liability could have attached to the officers and
directors of any corporation under Cal. Corp. Code § 25504.12 This scenario is

12

Section 25504 provides that "[e]very person who directly or indirectly
controls a person liable under Section 25501...[and] every principle executive
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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readily distinguishable from the present case, where Appellants have set forth
uncontested facts which would give rise to LES' liability under Utah's securities
laws, and therefore Appellees' liability as controlling persons.
Goehring v. Superior Court, 62 Cal. App. 4th 894 (1998) is also inapposite,
for the simple reason that it does not arise under Cal. Corp. Code § 25504. Rather,
plaintiffs in that case charged the members of a partnership with violations of
common law fraud, in addition to Cal. Corp. Code §§ 25110 and 25400. Neither
of these latter two statutes, however, addresses control person liability, much less
the presumptive form of liability which obtains under section 25504 (and by
analogy to section 61-1-22(4)). Hence, in Goehring, under the analysis set forth
by Appellants herein, it would not have been possible to impute the acts of the
partnership or corporation to the partners, which in turn could have provided the
necessary minimum contacts to satisfy California's version of the long-arm statute
(Cal. Code Civ. Proc. §410.10).
Appellees recognize that there is little or no caselaw interpreting section 611-22(4) in the present context, but provide no meaningful rebuttal to the closest
available analogies from other states provided by Appellants.

officer or director of a corporation so liable" is liable jointly and severally "with
and to the same extent as such person" or corporation. (Emphasis added). Hence,
_ when the liable party under section 25501 is a person, section 25504 may arguably
be read to require some proof of whether the alleged controlling person actually
"directly or indirectly" controlled them. However, when the liable party under
section 25501 is a corporation, section 25504 expressly eliminates any such
requirement.
-19-
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Section 61-1 -22(4) places the burden of proof as to a defendant's lack of
knowledge or reasonable grounds to believe in the existence of facts contributing
to their liability on the defendant himself. Utah Code Ann. § 61-1-22(4). In
applying the virtually identically worded Cal. Corp. Code § 31302, California
courts have required precisely what Appellants assert is required in the present
instance: proof, by Appellees, of their lack of knowledge or reasonable grounds to
believe in the facts by which the underlying securities fraud is alleged to have
arisen. See Eastwood v. FroelicL 60 Cal. App. 3d 523, 530-53 (1976). "Lack of
knowledge or reasonable grounds to believe is an exemption to the liability
imposed on corporate officers [by the securities laws].. .the burden of proof restfsl
upon Tthe officers] to invoke the exemption." The Neptune Society Corporation,
et al. v. Longanecker, 194 Cal. App. 3d 1233, 1248 (1987) (emphasis added). As
pointed out in Appellants' opening brief, since the relevant officer in Neptune
Society had failed to meet this burden, the Court affirmed judgment against her
even though the record was "completely silent on [the defendant's] knowledge or
involvement in the.. .issue altogether." Id.
In Courtney v. Waring, plaintiffs sought recovery from two vice-presidents
and a director of an entity not named in the complaint but yet purportedly liable
under section 31201 of the California Corporations Code. Courtney v. Waring,
191 Cal. App. 3d 1434, 1440 (1987). Holding that "while factual questions may
arise as to the defendants' status," the court held that where, under the plain
language of the statute, "each of the defendants [fell] within one of the statutory
- 20 -
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categories .. .the complaint adequately pleadfed] a cause of action under section
31302" and that, as such, "defendants [were] properly subject to suit." Id.
(emphasis added). Finally, in Eastwood, the California court affirmed that absent
successful invocation of the "exemption" to liability under the securities statute,
defendant officers and directors of a foreign corporation were "controlling
persons" who could be subject to suit in California. Eastwood, 60 Cal. App. 3d at
531.
Appellees choose simply not to address these directly analogous cases,13
and largely do not address out-of-state authority interpreting statutes similar to
section 61-1-22(4).14 Their limited attempts to distinguish these cases are also
unpersuasive. In Binder v. Gordian Securities, 742 F. Supp. 663, 668 (N.D. Ga.
1990) (see Thomas et al. Br. at 30-31), the court actually held that the defendant's
position as vice-president and shareholder of the company was sufficient to deem
him a "controlling person" under both federal and Georgia law. The court further
stated that it was not necessary that plaintiff establish or allege that defendant
"actually participated in the challenged transaction, as such a requirement would
render meaningless the concept of secondary, 'controlling person' liability." Id.

13

Appellees barely mention these cases, and do so only in a footnote to
argue, incorrectly, that these cases "do not address" personal jurisdiction.
Bragagnolo Br. at 19, n. 8; Thomas et al. Br. at 28, fn. 12.
14

Only two of Appellees' briefs mention the cases Appellants set forth,
Goelitz v. Lathrop, 3 N.E. 2d 305 (111. App. Ct. 1936) and Boddv v. Theiling, 129
Ga. App. 273 (Ga. App. 1973). See Thomas et al. Br. at 30; Bragagnolo Br. at 19,
fn. 8.
-21-

271959.1

Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

The court further distinguished defendant's status as vice-president and
shareholder of the company in question with that where one's status as a "director,
if anything, was only a misrepresentation...." Id. Appellees here have not
contended and cannot contend that their positions as directors or officers of the
company were mere "misrepresentations." Gowdy v. Richter, 20 111. App. 3d 514,
529 (1974) is similarly unpersuasive in the present context, as that case did not
arise out of or even discuss a statute analogous to section 61-1-22(4), and dealt
instead with the requirement of alleging an officer's or director's "culpability" in
order to pierce the corporate veil. Id.; cf. Thomas et al. Br. at 30.
Appellees further misstate the federal authorities cited by Appellants.
McNamara v. Bre-X Minerals Ltd., 46 F. Supp. 2d 628, 635 (E.D. Tex. 1999)
actually observed that the control-person provisions under federal securities law
"ha[ve] been read liberally" and that they require only the "power to direct.. .short
of actual direction" in order to establish a prima facie case for liability. The court
additionally noted that a prima facie case for liability by necessity gave rise to
personal jurisdiction. Id. at 636. Derensis v. Coopers & Lvbrand Chartered
Accountants, 930 F. Supp. 1003 (D. N.J. 1996) in fact held that defendants' mere
presence on the auditing committee was sufficient to meet plaintiff's "culpable
participation" pleading standard - an undeniably higher pleading burden than that
under which Appellants are operating under section 61-1-22(4).
Appellees would essentially have this Court require that Appellants set
forth the "culpable conduct of each individual defendant" in order to assert
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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personal jurisdiction over them. However, that showing is precisely what is not
required under the explicit terms of section 61-1-22(4) in order to hold Appellees
accountable for their control of an entity liable under Utah's securities laws.
Appellees cannot require at the jurisdictional phase what would not even be
required at trial. See, e.g., Hollinger v. Titan Capital Corp., 914 F.2d 1564, 1575
(9th Cir. 1990) ("in an action based on section 20(a)" - the federal analog to
section 61-1-22(4) - "the defendant who is a controlling person, and not the
plaintiff, bears the burden of proof as to defendant's good faith.")
Several Appellees belatedly argue that the uncontested facts would not give
rise to LES' section 61-1-22(1) liability as the company may not have been a
"seller" of securities. See Thomas et al Br. at 19. However, such factual
arguments are contradicted by the evidence and unchallenged allegations
submitted by the Bondholders, and are foreclosed by Appellees' failure to raise
them in the trial court. Neways, 950 P.2d at 422. In addition, full determination
of fact questions relating to the company's potential liability would be premature
at the pleadings stage. Id.; Anderson, 807 P.2d at 827.
Finally, § § 61 -1 -1, 61 -1 -22 are closely modeled upon Section 12(2) of the
Securities Act of 1933. See 15 U.S.C.A. § 771; cf. Steenblik v. Lichfield, 906 P.
2d 872 (Utah 1995). Under the relevant federal securities laws, even where a
securities offering is fully underwritten, hence making the underwriter the
technical "seller," the company remains liable to purchasers on the offering. See,
e.g., Pinter v. Dahl 486 U.S. 622 (1988) (holding that Uability under § 12 of the
-23-
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Securities Act extends to any person "who successfully solicits the purchase,
motivated at least in part by a desire to serve his own financial interests or those of
the securities owner").15
III.

CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, the trial court erred in finding that Appellees

were not subject to personal jurisdiction in the state of Utah for their alleged
violations of Utah's securities laws. The judgment of the trial court should be
reversed, and Appellees' collective motions to dismiss the Complaint denied.

Dated: July 30, 2003
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15

The federal case on which Appellees rely for the notion that section 61-122(4) requires strict privity was decided prior to Pinter v. DahPs clarification of
section 12. See Thomas et al. Br. at 19-20 (citing In re Diasonics Securities
Litigation, 599 F. Supp. 447 (N.D. Cal. 1984)). Moreover, "[a]lthough...federal
courts have construed similar state securities statutes, the decisions do not reflect
state court analysis. They instead reflect a federal analysis of section 12(2) as
applied to the state law in question." Haberman v. Washington Power Supply
System, 109 Wash. 2d 107, 129 (Wash. 1987).
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